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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 









TRUSTEES OF THE PENSION FUND OF THE 
IRONWORKERS DISTRICT COUNCIL OF NORTHERN NEW 
JERSEY; THE NORTHERN DISTRICT COUNCIL OF 
IRONWORKERS, and its Constituent Local Unions 
 
On Appeal From the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.C. Civ. No. 92-cv-01655) 
 
Argued: January 21, 1997 
 
Before: NYGAARD, LEWIS, Circuit Judges, and 
SCHWARZER, Senior District Judge* 
 





*The Honorable William W Schwarzer, Senior District Judge for the 
Northern District of California, sitting by designation. 
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Connell and Charles Nelson 
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11 Cleveland Place 
Springfield, New Jersey 07081 
Attorney for Appellees Trustees of the 
Pension Fund of the Ironworkers 
District Council of Northern New 
Jersey and the Northern District 
Council of Ironworkers and its 
Constituent Local Unions 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
SCHWARZER, Senior District Judge. 
 
In this appeal we are again called on to interpret the 
"actual knowledge" requirement in ERISA's statute of 
limitations in an action for breach of fiduciary duty. See 29 
U.S.C. § 1113(a)(2)(A); see also Kurz v. Philadelphia Elec. 
Co., 96 F.3d 1544 (3d Cir. 1996); International Union of 
Electronic Workers v. Murata Erie North America, Inc., 980 
F.2d 889 (3d Cir. 1992); Gluck v. Unisys Corp., 960 F.2d 
1168 (3d Cir. 1992). 
 
Phillip Connell, who worked as an ironworker in covered 
employment1 nearly continuously between 1962 and 1993, 
and Charles Nelson, who has worked as an ironworker in 
covered employment periodically since 1951, brought this 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. According to the Fund's pension plan booklet," `Covered Employment' 
consists of the jobs for which contributions are made to the pension 
fund [by the employer]." 
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action against the Pension Fund of the Ironworkers District 
Council of Northern New Jersey (the "Fund"). The Fund 
manages the pension plan established under a collective 
bargaining agreement between employers and the Northern 
District Council of Ironworkers (whose locals are affiliated 
with the International Association of Bridge, Structural & 
Ornamental Ironworkers, AFL-CIO) (the "Union"). Connell 
and Nelson claim that the Fund acted arbitrarily and 
capriciously in violation of 29 U.S.C. §§ 186(c)(5) and 1104 
when it enforced its break-in-service rule, which provides 
for cancellation of accrued pension credits after a specified 
absence from covered employment, thereby canceling their 
previously earned credits.2 The Fund contends, among 
other things, that because Connell and Nelson failed to file 
their action within three years of receiving actual notice 
that certain of their pension credits were canceled, the 
action is barred by the ERISA statute of limitations. 
 
Connell worked as an ironworker from 1962 to 1968 and 
again from 1971 to 1993. He testified at trial that he first 
knew that he had lost certain pension credits as a result of 
his break in service when he received a credit statement 
from the District Council in 1981. Connell then consulted 
his pension plan book and found the break-in-service rule. 
He went to see his business agent to complain and then 
called the Fund representative, who "quoted the broken- 
service [sic] rule, that if you're out three years and you 
aren't vested . . . you lose the credit for those years you had 




2. Connell and Nelson also claimed that the Union's discriminatory 
hiring practices, see Ironworkers, Local 373, 232 NLRB 504 (1977), enf'd 
sub nom., NLRB v. International Ass'n of Bridge, Structural & Ornamental 
Ironworkers, Local 373, 586 F.2d 835 (3d Cir. 1978); Moore v. Local 483, 
International Ass'n of Bridge, Structural & Ornamental Ironworkers, 66 
N.J. 527 (1975), diminished their capacity to earn a decent living as 
ironworkers and that their breaks in service were therefore involuntary 
and subject to an equitable exception to the break-in-service rule. See, 
e.g., Knauss v. Gorman, 583 F.2d 82 (3d Cir. 1978) (holding that 
enforcement of a break-in-service clause was arbitrary and capricious 
where employment hiatus was caused by involuntary unemployment and 
inability to find covered work). In view of our disposition of this appeal, 
we do not reach this claim. 
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Nelson worked off and on as an ironworker between 1951 
and 1973. He worked continuously outside the trade 
between 1973 and 1984. In 1984, Nelson resumed ironwork 
and remains in covered employment today. He testified that 
he first found out he had lost his pre-1974 pension credits 
about 1981 or 1982, when he received a document from the 
District Council stating that his credits for prior years of 
service had been canceled because he had two breaks in 
service. He contacted a union representative after receiving 
the notice of cancellation. As he said at trial,"That's when 
I thought I better find out about this whole thing." 
Appellee's Br. at 13 (quoting Nelson's testimony at trial). 
 
After a bench trial, the district court ruled in favor of the 
Fund, finding that the claims were not time-barred but that 
application of the break-in-service rule to Connell and 
Nelson was not arbitrary and capricious because they 
voluntarily left covered employment when jobs were 
available with notice that such departures would cause 
their pension credits to be canceled. Connell and Nelson 
appeal the district court's decision.3  We have jurisdiction of 





The claims of Connell and Nelson against the Fund for 
breach of fiduciary duty arise under 29 U.S.C. §§ 186(c)(5) 
and 1104(a)(1)(A)(i).4 ERISA's statute of limitations, 29 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. The dissent suggests that we have disregarded the factual findings 
underlying the district court's disposition of the Fund's statute of 
limitations defense. We do not question the district court's findings, but 
we nevertheless "exercise[ ] a plenary standard of review when applying 
legal precepts to undisputed facts." Easley v. Snider, 36 F.3d 297, 300 
(3d Cir. 1994). We therefore review de novo the district court's decision 
whether to apply 29 U.S.C. § 1113(a)(2) on the facts before it. 
 
4. Nelson also purports to state a claim under 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B) 
(permitting an action to be brought by a beneficiary "to clarify his rights 
to future benefits under the terms of the plan"). No such claim exists 
independent of his claim for breach of fiduciary duty--i.e., Nelson's only 
claim for "future benefits" arises out of his contention that the Fund, by 
canceling credits under its break-in-service rule, breached its fiduciary 
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U.S.C. § 1113(a)(2)(A), applies to claims arising under both 
of these statutory provisions.5 See Struble v. N.J. Brewery 
Emp. Welfare Trust Fund, 732 F.2d 325, 331-32 (3d Cir. 
1984). That section provides in relevant part: 
 
No action may be commenced . . . with respect to a 
fiduciary's breach of any . . . obligation . . . after the 
earlier of-- 
 
(1) six years after (A) the date of the last action which 
constituted a part of the breach or violation . . . or . . . 
 
(2) three years after the earliest date on which the 
plaintiff had actual knowledge of the breach or violation 
. . . . 
 
29 U.S.C. § 1113(a). We have held that "Section 1113 sets 
a high standard for barring claims against fiduciaries prior 
to the expiration of the section's six-year limitations 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
duty in violation of §§ 186(c)(5) and 1104. Under the facts of this case, 
§ 1132(a)(1)(B) does not create a right to relief distinct from that arising 
under §§ 186(c)(5) and 1104. And even if Nelson were able to state a 
claim under § 1132(a)(1)(B), the claim would be time-barred. New 
Jersey's statute of limitations for contract actions, which would apply, 
see Kennedy v. Electricians Pension Plan, 954 F.2d 1116, 1120 (5th Cir. 
1992) (quoting Johnson v. State Mut. Life Ass. Co., 942 F.2d 1260, 1262 
(8th Cir. 1991); see also National Iranian Oil Co. v. Mapco Int'l, Inc., 983 
F.2d 485, 492 (citing Johnson with approval as an example where state 
statute of limitations was applied to federal statute that lacked a time 
bar), is six years. N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:14-1. As Nelson had notice of his 
forfeited credits in 1981 or 1982, the statute began to run on that date, 
and whatever cause of action he might have had under § 1132(a)(1)(B) 
was barred after 1987 or 1988. 
 
5. Connell and Nelson claim that we may not consider the Fund's statute 
of limitations argument because the Fund failed to cross-appeal from the 
district court's adverse ruling on that issue. Their contention is without 
merit. Because the Fund "seek[s] to sustain th[e] judgment [below] . . . 
there was no need for a cross appeal." Reserve Ins. Co. v. Brokerage 
Surplus Corp., 570 F.2d 487, 491 (3d Cir. 1978) (citing 9 Moore's 
Practice ¶ 204.11(3) (2d ed.)); see United States v. American Ry. Exp. Co., 
265 U.S. 425, 435 (1924) (stating that "it is likewise settled that the 
appellee may, without taking a cross-appeal, urge in support of a decree 
any matter appearing in the record, although his argument may involve 
an attack upon the reasoning of the lower court"). 
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period." Gluck v. Unisys Corp., 960 F.2d 1168, 1176 (3d 
Cir. 1992).6 " `[A]ctual knowledge of a breach or violation' 
requires that a plaintiff have actual knowledge of all 
material facts necessary to understand that some claim 
exists, which facts could include . . . knowledge of a 
transaction's harmful consequences . . . ." Id. at 1177 
(citations omitted). 
 
A breach may occur without a plaintiff's having suffered 
actual harm. Ziegler v. Connecticut General Life Ins. Co., 
916 F.2d 548, 551 (9th Cir. 1990). Plaintiffs' complaint that 
the Fund's cancellation of their pension credits under the 
break-in-service rule is arbitrary and capricious sufficiently 
alleges a claim for breach of fiduciary duties. See Knauss v. 
Gorman, 583 F.2d 82 (3d Cir. 1978). If a breach was 
committed, it therefore must have occurred upon 
cancellation of the credits; by the terms of the plan, 
accrued credits were canceled immediately after a break-in- 
service exceeded the period specified by the plan (i.e., in 
1971 for Connell and in 1964 and 1978 for Nelson). 
 
In Gluck we held that mere knowledge of amendments of 
the employer's benefit plan, the effect of which was to cause 
accrued benefits not to fully vest upon partial termination, 
could not be deemed actual knowledge of a violation of the 
technical provisions of ERISA. We noted that: 
 
the company literature distributed to employees . . . 
described [the amendments] as improving participants' 
benefit packages. . . . For a participant to have 
discerned a cause of action for partial termination at 
that time . . . may have required a review of the plan 
document and of the plan's balance sheet . . . a level 
of research and scrutiny inconsistent with section 
1113's actual knowledge standard. 
 
Gluck, 960 F.2d at 1179. We remanded for a determination 
of "when each employee had actual knowledge of all 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. The Fund does not contend that the action is barred by the six-year 
statute. It is clear that if the forfeiture of pension credits under the 
break-in-service rule resulted in a breach of fiduciary duties, the last 
action constituting a part of that breach did not occur until payment of 
reduced pension benefits to the beneficiaries. 
 
                                6 
material facts relevant to a partial termination claim," 
having emphasized, however, "that our holding does not 
mean that the statute of limitations can never begin to run 
until a plaintiff first consults with a lawyer." Id. at 1177. 
 
Following Gluck, we held in International Union of 
Electronic Workers v. Murata Erie North America, Inc., 980 
F.2d 889, 900 (3d Cir. 1992), that beneficiaries who had 
notice of a plan amendment but were not informed that the 
amendment provided for reversion of excess funds to the 
employer lacked actual knowledge of a breach. As we then 
said, Murata "failed to make the showing of actual 
knowledge necessary to meet the `stringent requirement' 
imposed by . . . 29 U.S.C. 1113[(a)](2)." Id. at 901 (citing 
Gluck, 960 F.2d at 1176). 
 
Recently, we held that where a company decides to make 
a material change to its pension plan but misrepresents its 
intent to make such a modification, the statute of 
limitations will begin to run once an employee knows of the 
change in benefits and of his own ineligibility. See Kurz v. 
Philadelphia Elec. Co., 96 F.3d 1544, 1551 (3d Cir. 1996). 
In Kurz, we found that plaintiffs' knowledge of the change 
in plan was sufficient to begin the running of § 1113(a)(2) 
because: 
 
This was not a technical violation of ERISA, nor a 
cleverly concealed plan amendment. PECo openly 
announced that certain employees would receive better 
benefits, and others would not. 
 
Id. Similarly, the plaintiffs in this case were aware of the 
Fund's break-in-service rule and were aware that it had 
already been applied to them. 
 
It is undisputed that Connell and Nelson knew as early 
as 1981 or 1982 that the Fund had canceled their pension 
credits by applying the break-in-service rule and that the 
Fund's actions would diminish their future benefits. Like 
the plaintiffs in Kurz, their actual knowledge of both the 
alleged breach and the consequential injury they would 
thereby suffer gave them "knowledge that a fiduciary duty 
[may have] been breached or ERISA provision violated." 
Gluck, 960 F.2d at 1178. Indeed, both Connell and Nelson 
felt sufficiently aggrieved by the Fund's actions to question 
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their union representatives. Thus by 1981 or 1982, Connell 
and Nelson had "actual knowledge of all of the [material] 
elements of the violation," Gluck, 960 F.2d at 1176, 
including knowledge of the harmful consequencesflowing 
from the cancellation of the credits. See International Union, 
980 F.2d at 901; Gluck, 960 F.2d at 1177, 1179. There was 
nothing left for them to discover and nothing more for them 
to do but to file suit or to seek legal counsel. As we stated 
in Kurz, "the `harmful consequences' .. . were obvious." 
Kurz, 96 F.3d at 1551 (citation omitted).7 Their action, 
having been filed more than three years after 1982, is 
therefore time-barred. 
 




7. The dissent's hypothetical concerning a pair of ironworkers 
discriminated against on the basis of their nonunion status has no 
bearing here. Unlike the dissent's hypothetical plaintiffs, who were 
unaware that they had lost pension credits because they were not union 
members, Connell and Nelson clearly knew in 1981 or 1982 of the 
break-in-service rule, of the union's discriminatory practices, of their 
own employment histories, and of the effect of the rule's application to 
them. The hypothetical, sound as it may be on its own terms, is 
therefore not relevant to the facts of this case. 
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LEWIS, Circuit Judge, concurring and dissenting. 
 
I agree with the majority's conclusion that the district 
court's judgment should be affirmed. I write separately, 
however, because I disagree that ERISA's statute of 
limitations bars the Appellants' claim. 
 
My disagreement lies with the majority's interpretation 
and application of Gluck v. Unisys Corporation , 960 F.2d 
1168 (3d Cir. 1992). In Gluck, we held that "actual 
knowledge of a breach or violation requires knowledge of all 
relevant facts at least sufficient to give the plaintiff 
knowledge that a fiduciary duty has been breached or 
ERISA provision violated." Gluck, 960 F.2d at 1178. This 
requires "the district court [to] determine, as a factual 
matter, the date on which each employee had actual 
knowledge of the breach or violation." Id. at 1176. 
Knowledge of the breach is distinguished from knowledge of 
the actions constituting the breach or violation. See id.; 
International Union of Electronic Workers v. Murata Erie 
North America, Inc., 980 F.2d 889, 900 (3d Cir. 1992) 
(requiring a showing "that plaintiffs actually knew not only 
of the events that occurred which constitute the breach or 
violation but also that those events supported a claim of 
breach of fiduciary duty or violation under ERISA"). 
 
Noting Gluck's "stringent" actual knowledge requirement, 
the district court found that although the pension fund 
"demonstrated that plaintiffs became aware of their loss of 
pension credits during 1981," the fund had "failed to 
demonstrate that [Connell and Nelson] actually knew of 
their potential ERISA cause of action." Connell v. Pension 
Fund, Civ. No. 92-1655, slip op. at 16 (D.N.J. Jan. 2, 1996). 
To support this conclusion, the district court drew certain 
factual inferences from the testimony presented at the non- 
jury trial. Specifically, the court found that Connell's failure 
to take any action after learning of his loss of pension 
credits other than contacting the plan administrator and 
Nelson's failure to express any concerns to the plan 
administrator about the break-in-service rule "clearly 
indicate[d] that [they] were not aware of their potential 
cause of action." Id. at 6, 11 & 16. 
 
The majority seems to overlook the district court's factual 
inferences, concluding: 
 
                                9 
[I]t is undisputed in this case that Connell and Nelson 
knew as early as 1981 or 1982 that the Fund had 
canceled their pension credits by applying the break- 
in-service rule and that the Fund's actions would 
diminish their future benefits. Their actual knowledge 
of both the alleged breach and the consequential injury 
they would thereby suffer gave them "knowledge that a 
fiduciary duty [may have] been breached or ERISA 
provision violated." 
 
Maj. Op. at 7 (quoting Gluck, 960 F.2d at 1178) (alteration 
of Gluck in original). The majority's conclusion does not 
follow from its premise. Although it was established that 
Connell and Nelson knew in 1981 or 1982 of the pension 
fund's action which constituted the alleged breach -- that 
is, its enforcement of the break-in-service rule -- it does not 
follow that they had actual knowledge of the breach itself. 
The majority further notes, again without reference to the 
district court's findings, that Connell and Nelson must have 
had " `actual knowledge of all of the [material] elements of 
the violation' " because they "felt sufficiently aggrieved by 
the Fund's actions to question their union representatives." 
Maj. Op. at 8 (quoting Gluck, 960 F.2d at 1178). 
 
As noted earlier, however, the district court reached the 
exact opposite conclusion from the same facts and 
testimony cited by the majority. Indeed, the district court 
found that Connell's and Nelson's actions after receiving 
notice of their lost pension credits "clearly indicate[d] that 
plaintiffs were not aware of their potential ERISA cause of 
action." Connell, Civ. No. 92-1655, slip op. at 16. I would 
not disregard, as the majority does, the district court's 
factual determination that Connell's and Nelson's actions, 
or lack thereof, indicated that they had no knowledge of a 
breach. 
 
Moreover, contrary to the majority's indication, it is not 
enough that the plaintiffs have knowledge that afiduciary 
duty "may have" been breached or ERISA provision 
violated. Rather, the plaintiff must have actual knowledge 
that a fiduciary duty "has" been breached or ERISA 
provision violated. See Gluck, 960 F.2d at 1178. 
 
While this distinction may seem merely semantic, it is 
important, as perhaps the following hypothetical will 
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explain. Assume that Smith and Jones were non-union iron 
workers who occasionally worked in the iron trade and 
participated in a multi-employer pension fund that 
supported both union and non-union workers. In 1981, 
Smith and Jones received notice that some of their pension 
credits would be lost because they had incurred breaks in 
service. Assume further that they questioned a 
representative of the Fund but were told that the Fund was 
merely enforcing its break-in-service rule, of which they 
were on notice. Jones and Smith were upset about their 
lost credits and may have even assumed that the Fund was 
treating them unfairly. But, without any other information, 
Jones and Smith thought that they were just out of luck. 
Now assume that in 1990, Jones and Smith discovered that 
the Fund was in practice only applying the break-in-service 
rule to non-union workers. 
 
Under Gluck, the statute of limitations would start to run 
in 1990, when Smith and Jones learned that the Fund was 
discriminating in its enforcement of the break-in-service 
rule. In other words, the statute would start to run when 
they possessed knowledge that the enforcement of the 
break-in-service rule violated ERISA. Under the majority's 
analysis, which, in my view, relaxes Gluck's "stringent" 
requirement, Jones and Smith would be barred from 
bringing their claim because the three-year statute would 
have started running in 1981 when they first learned that 
they had lost credits due to their break in service. 
 
The hypothetical discussed above is not that different 
from the case at hand. Here, Connell and Nelson admit that 
they knew in 1981 or 1982 that they had lost credits. But 
they allege that they incurred the breaks in service because 
the union had discriminated against them in allocating iron 
work. Thus, if Connell and Nelson could show that they 
had left the ironworking trade involuntarily, enforcement of 
the break-in-service rule against them might have 
constituted a breach of ERISA.1 Had the union's 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. We recognized in Knauss v. Gorman, 583 F.2d 82 (3d Cir. 1978), that 
if a plan beneficiary incurs a break in service involuntarily, the pension 
fund must come forward with a justification for why the rule is 
enforceable. See also Van Fossan v. International Brotherhood of 
Teamsters, 649 F.2d 1243, 1248 (7th Cir. 1981) ("We believe the 
distinction between voluntary and involuntary breaks in service is 
crucial to determining the arbitrariness of the operation of a given break 
in service rule."). 
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discrimination forced Connell and Nelson out of the trade 
involuntarily, and had they not had actual knowledge of the 
discrimination (say, for example, they thought that they 
just were unlucky in obtaining work), they would not have 
possessed the requisite "actual knowledge" of a breach of 
fiduciary duty or ERISA violation merely when they had 
been notified of their lost credits. Indeed, they would be 
lacking "actual knowledge of all material facts constituting 
[the] breach of fiduciary duty or violation of ERISA [which] 
is the sine qua non for application of [ERISA's] three-year 
limitation." Gluck, 960 F.2d at 1177. 
 
Put simply, then, the actual knowledge requirement is 
necessarily intertwined with the cause of action or the 
theory of the breach. See Martin v. Consultants & 
Administrators, Inc., 966 F.2d 1078 (7th Cir. 1992) (courts 
must take into account "the complexity of the underlying 
factual transaction, the complexity of the legal claim and 
the egregiousness of the alleged violation"). 
 
At bottom, a determination of what the plaintiffs knew 
and when is a very fact-intensive inquiry. See Gluck, 960 
F.2d at 1176 (requiring the district court to determine "as 
a factual matter" when the statute began to run). I cannot 
agree with the majority's disregard of the inferences that 
the district court drew from the facts here. 
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